Rafik Hariri's assassination on Valentine's Day 2005 ushered in a new era of violence, instability, and uncertainty in post-civil war Lebanon. Since Hariri's murder, numerous other political figures - including respected reporters and members of the Lebanese Armed Forces - have been the victims of anonymous assassins. Photos of the deceased can be found all over Beirut, and are a constant reminder to all of the risks associated with participating in Lebanese politics.In coordination with the Lebanese government, which requested that the United Nations help investigate and prosecute those responsible for Hariri's assassination, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon formally coalesced following an authorization from the UN Security Council on May 30, 2007. The Tribunal can be seen as an extension of the international investigation that began with the Security Council's creation of the International Independent Investigation Commission (IIIC) in April of 2005. On January 17th, 2011, prosecutor Daniel Bellemare sent the sealed indictments to pre-trial judge Daniel Fransen for his review. Having already anticipated that the indictments single-out members of Hizballah, the group’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has been throwing around his political clout in order to stymie any attempt by the Lebanese government to cooperate with the Tribunal.
Days before the indictments were turned over to judge Fransen, 11 ministers resigned from the cabinet in protest over the politicized nature of the Tribunal and former Prime Minister Hariri's reluctance to participate in an emergency cabinet meeting before the indictments were submitted. Although many western news sources depicted the ministerial resignations in a subversive light – many reported that Hizballah "toppled" the Lebanese government - by withdrawing its support from a coalition government established nearly 14 months ago, Hizballah did what any savvy minority party would do if placed in a similar situation: dissolve the current government until the majority party compromises.
In a bizarre turn of events following the collapse of Saad Hariri's government, Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, did an about-face and joined forces with the former minority coalition. Najib Mikati, a Sunni billionaire with close ties Syria, is the new Prime Minister, having received 68 out of 128 votes from parliament. On January 24th, the day after Mikati was chosen, Hariri loyalists participated in a "day of rage." Roads were blocked off by garbage and burning tires, and demonstrations were held throughout Tripoli, parts of Beirut and other areas around the country. Although there were widespread fears that the "rage" would last longer than a day, the protests were truly short-lived, and a sense of calm has since returned to Beirut.
Now, President Michel Suleiman has invited Mikati to establish a new government, a formidable task considering that March 14th MP's loyal to Hariri claim that Mikati cannot be imposed" on March 14th. In an apparent response to Mikati, who vowed to "extend his hand" to all Lebanese factions, Saad Hariri was quoted as saying, "There is a candidate named Saad Hariri and another candidate nominated by the Opposition."
The investigation into Hariri's assassination has been nothing short of circus-like, filled with false arrests, make-believe witnesses, and enough speculation to irritate the most seasoned gossiper. Initially, the investigation implicated Syria in Hariri's murder, relying on two witnesses: Husam Taher Husam and Muhammad Suhair Siddiq. According to an article titled, "The Hariri Investigation and the Politics of Perception" by Gary Gambill, Husam admitted to having fabricated testimony that implicated Syria after having been tortured and bribed by March 14th coalition leaders, and Der Spiegel, a German magazine, revealed that Siddiq was nothing more than a con man that had been paid for his testimony. Nevertheless, their testimony resulted in the arrest of four Lebanese senior intelligence and security officers. Recently, a tape recording of Saad Hariri’s secret meeting with one of these witnesses aired on the Lebanese New TV, which damaged Hariri’s personal credibility and the credibility of the investigation.
Complicating the efficacy of the Tribunal is the fact that the United States - throughout the waning years of GW Bush's tenure and Obama's first two years in office - has aggressively intervened in the IIIC, the Tribunal and the relationship between the March 14th coalition and the Opposition, which is led by Hizballah and Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. With their sights undoubtedly set on Hizballah, the Bush administration pushed for a tribunal charter that would not only maximize American influence over the appointment of judges and prosecutors, but would also allow trials to commence in absentia (without the defendant present) and "relaxed evidentiary standards" for convictions. (Gambill)
In the months leading up to Israel's "war" with Hizballah in the summer of 2006, which Israel had been planning since at least 2004, the late Ze'ev Schiff, former dean of Israel's military correspondents, said, “US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is the figure leading the strategy of changing the situation in Lebanon [aka eliminating the perceived threat Hizballah posed to Israel], not Prime Minister Ehud Olmert or Defense Minister Amir Peretz.” (Zunes, Stephen. Washington’s Proxy War. p. 2)
During a summit with former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on May 23, 2006, GW Bush strongly encouraged Olmert to launch an attack against Hizballah, pledging the full support of the United States. (Zunes, p. 2) Three days after the summit, two militants were killed in Saida, precipitating a series of tit-for-tat events between Hizballah and Israel, culminating in the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006 and Israel’s widely condemned, 34-day onslaught against Lebanon.
For its part, the Obama administration's meddling in Lebanese affairs took a backseat initially to its efforts to broker "peace" between Israel and the Palestinians (Al-Jazeera's release of nearly 2,000 previously confidential documents detailing more than a decade of "negotiations" between Israel and the Palestinian Authority shows, in embarrassing detail, the cowardice of a Palestinian Authority that prefers to placate Israel and the United States rather than properly represent the Palestinians; Israel's malicious intransigence throughout the "negotiations," as it slowly used the "peace process" as a means of co-opting the Palestinian Authority into its apartheid framework; and the Obama administration's reluctance to do anything but cater to Israel's territorial gluttony by allowing illegal settlement expansion and encouraging the Palestinians to abandon the 1949 Armistice lines as borders for a future Palestinian state).
Like Bush, Obama has also pursued a policy of direct intervention in Lebanon. Negotiations between the Lebanese coalitions, which were recently brokered by Saudi Arabia and Syria, failed in large part because of Hilary Clinton's pressure on Saad Hariri to remain uncompromising in his attitude towards the Tribunal. US Ambassador to Lebanon, Maura Connelly, was recently criticized - and made fun of - by Lebanese officials and news anchors alike for meeting with low-level deputy minister Nicolas Fattoush in a last-minute attempt to convince him to back Saad Hariri and the March 14th coalition. Fattoush ignored Connelly and backed Mikati.
There are also rumors that the United States is threatening to withdraw its monetary support of the Lebanese Armed Forces following Mikati’s appointment. Such a move would be purely symbolic, though, as US aid to the LAF is parsimonious at best, considering that the United States has an agreement with Israel to help it maintain a "Qualitative Military Edge" (QME) over its Arab neighbors.
Still, the question begs: If Hizballah is truly innocent, then why would its leadership react so negatively to being (potentially) implicated in Hariri’s murder? To be clear, if the Tribunal can put an end to political assassinations in Lebanon or, at the very least, deter people from enabling or participating in political assassinations in the future, everyone would be in full support. Therefore, it is important to understand why Hizballah is hostile towards the Tribunal, as its position is representative of a large proportion of Lebanese.
Picture a scenario in which you have been accused of a murder that you maintain you absolutely did not commit. Now imagine that those accusing you of committing said murder are your political rivals, and have an obvious incentive in seeing you arrested, prosecuted, and convicted. In addition, consider that the court in which you will be tried is heavily influenced by your political rivals (whether one wants to admit it or not, the United States has an inordinate amount of influence over many UN bodies, including the International Court of Justice) and that in the court of public opinion, many consider you guilty, trial or no trial.
What are your choices? The first is to receive the indictment quietly, allow a trial to commence, and hope that justice is served and that you are vindicated. The second, and obviously more tempting choice, is to aggressively assert your innocence, pointing out the substantial political interests at stake that present an obvious motive for the accusations brought against you.
What is the physical evidence against Hizballah? According to a report by the Canadian Broadcasting Company, one that was severely criticized by the Tribunal for exacerbating preexisting tensions inside Lebanon, Hizballah is responsible for Hariri's death because of cell phone records that put Hizballah operatives at the scene of Hariri's assassination on 2/14/2005. According to the report, Hizballah admitted that the phones under investigation belonged to Hizballah operatives, but that they were being used for counter-intelligence efforts against Israeli spies.
While this evidence is certainly troublesome, it is far from damning; more likely than not, Hizballah was following Hariri on the day he was assassinated, which is not unusual. Does this mean that Hizballah is responsible for Hariri's death? Maybe, maybe not. Does it mean that Hizballah knew about the assassination, and did nothing to stop it? Maybe, maybe not. However, the mere presence of Hizballah operatives at the scene of Hariri's assassination, and along the route his motorcade took on February 14th, 2005, does not automatically prove - by any reasonable standard - that Hizballah was responsible for his death.
The CBC report also uncovered evidence regarding Col. Wissam al-Hassan, the head of Lebanon’s Internal Security Force, and the man responsible for Hariri's security the day he was assassinated. On February 14, 2005, Hassan was supposed to be with Hariri's motorcade, but had to instead sit for a mandatory exam at the Lebanese University (Lebanon's elite politicians and government officials are rarely, if ever, asked to actually sit for exams). Hassan claimed he received permission from Hariri to take the exam during a conversation on 2/13/2005. However, phone records indicate that al-Hassan contacted his professor about the exam on February 13th only after speaking with Hariri. The next morning, in the hours before Hariri's assassination, al-Hassan claimed he needed to study for his exam and never met with Hariri. Instead of studying, Hassan made 24 phone calls before arriving at Lebanese University, an average of one phone call every nine minutes.
Yet, since the Tribunal has relied heavily on maintaining a positive relationship with the ISF, UN Commissioner Serge Brammertz, head of the IIIC, rejected any further investigation into the possibility that al-Hassan participated in Hariri's assassination. Brammertz made this decision in spite of the fact that a confidential UN report stated that al-Hassan's alibi is, "weak and inconsistent."
According to the statutes governing the Tribunal, the Lebanese government is obligated to make arrests in compliance with the indictments. The following are four possible scenarios as to what may happen when the indictments are issued publicly:
1. The indictments are made public and there will be sporadic fighting in areas where support for Hariri is strong (some areas in Tripoli and a couple of locations around Beirut). These will not be organized skirmishes, and factions will call on people to show restraint. The US, France, and Britain will demand that the Lebanese authorities arrest whomever is implicated by the Tribunal. The Lebanese will, most likely, refuse this request. Israel will remain quiet throughout this whole process.
2. Replicate scenario 1, but assume that Israel will get involved, and use the indictment of Hizballah members as a pretext to aggravate another conflict in Lebanon like it did in the summer of 2006.
3. Replicate scenario 1, but assume that the Lebanese authorities attempt to arrest the Hizballah men indicted by the Tribunal. This would be a worst-case scenario, as all hell would break loose. Nasrallah has already said that Hizballah would, "cut the hand off anyone that tried to arrest its men." He was not speaking in metaphors...
4. Replicate scenario 1, but assume that the UN Security Council does not take kindly to Lebanon's refusal to arrest those indicted by the Tribunal. Sanctions could follow (an even more likely scenario considering the recent ousting of Saad Hariri), which would have the immediate effect of increasing Iranian and Syrian influence in Lebanon.
At this point, the dimensions of Lebanon's political sphere are changing daily. More likely than not, Najib Mikati will not be able to form a new government for months on end, and there will be a political stalemate as he will keep receiving just enough votes to maintain his post, but not enough support across Lebanon's factions to form a representative cabinet. Such games are nothing new for the Lebanese, however, and life will go on as recycled politicians continue to prioritize sectarian rivalries and interests over national unity.
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